It's nice to be optimistic, but I would not be so sure about that... we don't need help to reverse engineer the algorithms: it's all publicly documented. We are only missing keys. But they are so much longer/stronger that there's no hope to brute or employ rainbow techniques.
It gets worse: we've only seen Biss2-CA, with rolling ecm keys (session words in EBU terms) in a crypto period ~30secs. To get the rolling keys, we need to decrypt the ecms with session keys. Those session keys are gotten from emms. Those emms are targeted to individual receivers. The emm key is updated per event, and not sent in the stream. It's sent by email or whatever (just like those leaked Tandberg v3 / D5 keys), but this time RSA encrypted and only decryptable by that one receiver using a unique key buried in firmware. So we need someone who has both valid entitlements and is prepared to leak the email & also extract their key from their receiver firmware to obtain their unique set of emm keys. So compromising the source of the leak -> game over.