Please upload PowerVU EMM Streams - Chat area

archiemc

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POWERVU HOME

Got it
loaded it up on win 7-64 and got valid keys
read that some ware that it needed 64 bit
thanks any way

archie
 

dssnosher

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58
Can someone please help me decipher this?

Code:
[2016/10/28 22:39:18.320] Please install: https://download.microsoft.com/download/2/E/6/2E61CFA4-993B-4DD4-91DA-3737CD5CD6E3/vcredist_x64.exe
[2016/10/28 22:40:11.464] 
Processing bin files.
[2016/10/28 22:40:11.475] Indexing C:\dvbdream\Modules\EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin file.
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.516] UA's: 12,681
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.522] Possible Expired UA's: 4,676
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.526] Processing .txt files.
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.531] Generate Statistics.
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.641] Total Packets: 17,357
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.643] Unique Packets: 17,357
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.645] Unique Packets With Patterns: 17,357
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.648] Unique UAs: 12,681
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.651] Note: The UA cycle is not completed. Try to log a larger file.
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.836] Patterns: 6,399,505
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.837] Not Processed Patterns: 2,151,501
[2016/10/28 22:40:19.840] Now click at start button to start the brute force.
[2016/10/28 22:40:31.139] Packet Type: EMM
[2016/10/28 22:40:31.141] S-Box Type: Primary
[2016/10/28 22:40:31.147] Start EMM Brute Force, CPU[8]
[2016/10/29 00:24:00.548] Yes! Key: E315128E3005DE, Pattern:49F0FB3B52726C
[2016/10/29 00:24:00.704] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 00:24:00.704] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 4E 82 CF 00 00 03 
80 8B 97 46 33 FB 91 94 97 08 58 40 B5 1F E4 4A 64 38 20 BB 25 84 0B 59 CD D8 5A 
80 8B 95 5A 7B 68 2A 38 EC 2A A4 80 9A 55 A7 B6 82 A3 8E C2 AA 48 09 A8 E3 3D BE 
80 8B 96 9E 76 C8 CD C4 9F 0F B3 B5 27 26 C4 00 10 6D 29 F1 FB 3B 52 7F 8E 6E 7A 
80 8B 94 9A 9F 68 72 19 49 62 B5 04 98 59 A9 F6 87 21 94 96 2B 50 49 88 B2 30 9D 
80 8B 92 9F EE CA 8C 28 4C 0C B8 26 7D 41 FE EC A8 C2 84 C0 CB 82 67 D4 53 9B 46 
09 8E 6C 2F 
[2016/10/29 00:24:01.141] =======False Positive Key==========
[2016/10/29 02:16:20.216] Yes! Key: B418EE67CE788E, Pattern:1B49D8813718FE
[2016/10/29 02:16:20.247] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 02:16:20.263] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 70 E8 00 00 03 
80 25 3C 06 82 85 A5 97 3A 57 6E DD 1F BF BA E3 83 65 AA 35 F6 ED D1 FE 02 71 11 
80 25 3E 2B A3 ED 6D 6B 8D 0D 7D 4B 99 82 BA 3E D6 D6 B8 D0 D7 D4 B9 9D D6 30 A6 
80 25 3D 8A 8F 95 2B A7 72 8B 3C 79 BC 8F BD EC 91 59 FB 5C 13 C7 9B CF 4A 1D 1C 
80 25 3F A9 8E EF 35 6E FC 0D 6D 4B 19 CA 98 EE F3 56 EF C0 D6 D4 B1 99 D6 B8 11 
80 25 38 87 F7 D6 BB 6A 8D A4 EC 40 9B 8C 7F 7D 6B B6 A8 DA 4E C4 09 B8 91 71 9F 
FE BB A3 D0 
[2016/10/29 02:16:21.121] =======False Positive Key==========
[2016/10/29 02:21:48.159] Yes! Key: F4ED84D0677A4E, Pattern:B930E9439AC899
[2016/10/29 02:21:48.315] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 02:21:48.315] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 4E 79 0C 00 00 03 
80 CA B6 34 14 2E 18 71 41 60 61 BC CD E4 44 CD 28 3A B4 38 C6 1B CC DB BD B3 0E 
80 CA B5 B4 59 5C CD 11 26 8A F6 79 0B DB 45 95 CC D1 12 68 AF 67 90 B8 C1 C2 22 
80 CA B7 2B 87 60 54 E8 19 E5 0D B4 D3 FB 28 FA 00 FC F6 7C 60 DB 4D 3A 24 FD 69 
80 CA B4 A1 D9 1B E0 29 02 08 B6 EF 29 7A 1D 91 BE 02 90 20 8B 6E F2 93 41 52 28 
80 CA B3 D9 BA BE 9F 4B 93 0E 94 39 AC 89 9B AB E9 F4 B9 30 E9 43 9A C8 F6 DC A5 
D3 EF 8B 6D 
[2016/10/29 02:21:48.736] =======False Positive Key==========
[2016/10/29 03:38:14.122] Yes! Key: CED019D2BFA8F1, Pattern:2522B2BAA7BED9
[2016/10/29 03:38:14.122] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 03:38:14.122] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 4B 0F 00 00 03 
80 49 E2 35 DB AF EB 75 72 3B BC 2D E2 2E F1 52 BD FF CC 3A 2B C2 DE 25 F1 04 3A 
80 49 E1 29 25 BA 0C 8F 18 08 3B 87 6A 32 92 5B A0 C8 F1 80 83 B8 76 A6 6B 4C 36 
80 49 E3 EC 2C 9C 6B 14 23 9D F4 18 B1 D3 CE DD B1 19 F1 86 8F 41 8B 1A 78 AC 66 
80 49 E0 F4 73 07 A4 5F 18 78 7B CA 9B 8F 47 30 7A 45 F1 87 87 BC A9 BE FA AA 33 
80 49 E7 DC 87 89 A7 25 22 B2 BA A7 BE D9 C8 78 9A 72 52 2B 2B AA 7B ED F0 8D 65 
EA 69 AE 47 
[2016/10/29 03:38:15.027] =======False Positive Key==========
[2016/10/29 05:11:26.395] Yes! Key: F044109B03659A, Pattern:18F7622D40461D
[2016/10/29 05:11:26.598] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 05:11:26.613] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 51 E2 00 00 03 
80 C8 D0 DB EF F1 57 7A 44 D1 60 55 BC BC C2 F1 A8 AD 80 EA 76 05 5B CF 18 CB D4 
80 C8 D2 56 CD 7D 67 E8 F0 06 5A A5 2D 05 6C D7 D6 7E 8F 00 65 AA 52 D5 6B 49 BC 
80 C8 D1 93 84 55 19 29 84 B8 46 3D D8 8B 50 11 87 65 91 8E 44 63 DD 8E 8A F5 0A 
80 C8 D3 BA 03 DA EF EE F9 67 AA E4 45 0B A0 3D AE FE EF 96 7A AE 44 55 83 9D 2E 
80 C8 D4 B9 38 A9 62 A7 F0 61 A9 26 1D B7 93 8A 96 2A 7F 06 1A 92 61 DB 26 C1 C7 
9D 58 EB EB 
[2016/10/29 05:11:26.629] The key belongs to the beginning of byte 20, Advanced the key, 2 bits '0'
[2016/10/29 05:11:26.629] The Key after rollfwd: BC11042EC0D966
[2016/10/29 05:11:26.629] This key can decrypt the last part of EMM (from the byte 20 to the end):
C8D1938455192984B8463DD88B50118765918E440000065051E2
[2016/10/29 05:11:43.430] IsDecrypted: True
[2016/10/29 05:11:43.430] EMM-Key: FBC0E4924E7F70
[2016/10/29 05:11:43.430] EMM:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 51 E2 00 00 03 
80 C8 D0 DB EF F1 57 7A 44 D1 60 55 BC BC C2 F1 A8 AD 80 EA 76 05 5B CF 18 CB D4 
80 C8 D2 56 CD 7D 67 E8 F0 06 5A A5 2D 05 6C D7 D6 7E 8F 00 65 AA 52 D5 6B 49 BC 
80 C8 D1 93 84 55 19 29 84 B8 46 3D D8 8B 50 11 87 65 91 8E 44 63 DD 8E 8A F5 0A 
80 C8 D3 BA 03 DA EF EE F9 67 AA E4 45 0B A0 3D AE FE EF 96 7A AE 44 55 83 9D 2E 
80 C8 D4 B9 38 A9 62 A7 F0 61 A9 26 1D B7 93 8A 96 2A 7F 06 1A 92 61 DB 26 C1 C7 
9D 58 EB EB 
[2016/10/29 05:11:43.430] EMM Dec:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 51 E2 00 00 03 
80 0C 00 00 00 30 FE B9 99 96 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 50 51 E2 
80 0C 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 50 51 E2 
80 0C 01 00 00 30 FE B9 99 FC 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 50 51 E2 
80 0C 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 50 51 E2 
80 0C 06 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 51 E2 
9D 58 EB EB 
[2016/10/29 05:11:43.430] 
P 0000 00 000030FEB99996 ; ECM Key0 [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 05:11:43.430] 
P 0000 01 000030FEB999FC ; ECM Key1 [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 05:11:43.446] 
P 005051E2 00 FBC0E4924E7F70 ; EMM Key [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 05:11:43.446] ===========================

[2016/10/29 06:09:06.391] Yes! Key: B5A7ECD8833DF0, Pattern:F2F4137CBA2503
[2016/10/29 06:09:06.422] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 06:09:06.422] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 57 9E 00 00 03 
80 1F CB C3 0F B0 65 7F 6F C9 C3 9E 74 88 73 8D 03 AA 3C 1E 9C 39 E7 4F F6 64 CA 
80 1F C8 A9 05 CC 2B 0B 4D BD 72 BD F8 AA 90 5C C2 B0 B4 DB D7 2B DF 8D 33 FC 6C 
80 1F CA DF 4F F8 3D 2F 2F 41 37 CB A2 50 3A 16 1E A0 9F 7A 93 7C BA 22 7D 39 AF 
80 1F C9 ED 4E C6 E2 27 49 8B 71 F3 7F 3E D4 EC 6E 22 74 98 B7 1F 37 F4 5A B9 F5 
80 1F CC E9 0A B5 35 67 5B 9F FD 7E E1 02 90 AB 53 56 75 B9 FF D7 EE 10 76 75 8E 
CB 81 FD EA 
[2016/10/29 06:09:06.968] =======False Positive Key==========
[2016/10/29 06:56:56.728] Yes! Key: C3781F6E4B30ED, Pattern:AB16C7F0DDAF65
[2016/10/29 06:56:56.869] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 06:56:56.869] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 4E 0B 06 00 00 03 
80 A7 76 07 DC 09 6A C5 B1 FC 37 6B D9 6B 1F EE 3A 8E A4 64 63 76 BD 9C 74 D0 0C 
80 A7 74 06 BC 3B 48 B5 03 B8 61 49 73 20 6B C3 B4 8B 50 3B 86 14 97 3E 35 EA 53 
80 A7 77 95 CD 05 E0 F5 34 C3 E1 53 55 7A C5 11 AD 24 5C FC BE 15 35 58 DB 2C 88 
80 A7 75 00 FB 36 CB F7 D2 8F 81 0F E3 20 0F B3 6C BF 7D 28 F8 10 FE 3E F5 39 82 
80 A7 72 45 AF E3 EC F7 7B E9 00 48 01 88 5A FE 3E CF 77 BE 90 04 80 18 DF 0C 4F 
0E F3 3B 4D 
[2016/10/29 06:56:57.305] =======False Positive Key==========
[2016/10/29 07:09:13.282] Yes! Key: BC6362840BE675, Pattern:68E40CC3D68B5C
[2016/10/29 07:09:13.329] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 07:09:13.329] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 73 16 00 00 03 
80 7A 84 2F E4 6C 8A 87 E5 AF 36 07 85 13 F6 27 CE B8 74 CC F3 60 78 54 9F 9F 00 
80 7A 87 65 E6 14 7B DF CF A6 AB FF B8 56 5E 61 47 BD FC FA 6A BF FB 82 47 FD 6B 
80 7A 85 0D 61 5D A2 C2 6D 71 4A 6A F7 8F 1F 19 4A 78 A9 DB 14 A6 AF 7F CB A8 3E 
80 7A 86 34 72 06 61 EB 45 AE 6B FF BB D3 47 20 66 1E B4 5A E6 BF FB BB 45 FC 7A 
80 7A 82 9F 0B B8 53 BD 6F B2 7F FC A9 51 F0 BB 85 3B D6 FB 27 FF CA 95 6D 31 B8 
87 03 E5 B0 
[2016/10/29 07:09:13.329] The key belongs to the beginning of byte 13, Advanced the key, 3 bits '0'
[2016/10/29 07:09:13.360] The Key after rollfwd: B78C6C5A817CCE
[2016/10/29 07:09:13.360] This key can decrypt the last part of EMM (from the byte 13 to the end):
7A8634720661EB45AE6BFFBBD300000000000000000006507316
[2016/10/29 07:09:14.390] IsDecrypted: True
[2016/10/29 07:09:14.405] EMM-Key: C51F9BACEBB8F6
[2016/10/29 07:09:14.405] EMM:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 73 16 00 00 03 
80 7A 84 2F E4 6C 8A 87 E5 AF 36 07 85 13 F6 27 CE B8 74 CC F3 60 78 54 9F 9F 00 
80 7A 87 65 E6 14 7B DF CF A6 AB FF B8 56 5E 61 47 BD FC FA 6A BF FB 82 47 FD 6B 
80 7A 85 0D 61 5D A2 C2 6D 71 4A 6A F7 8F 1F 19 4A 78 A9 DB 14 A6 AF 7F CB A8 3E 
80 7A 86 34 72 06 61 EB 45 AE 6B FF BB D3 47 20 66 1E B4 5A E6 BF FB BB 45 FC 7A 
80 7A 82 9F 0B B8 53 BD 6F B2 7F FC A9 51 F0 BB 85 3B D6 FB 27 FF CA 95 6D 31 B8 
87 03 E5 B0 
[2016/10/29 07:09:14.421] EMM Dec:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 50 73 16 00 00 03 
80 0C 00 00 00 30 FE B9 43 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 50 73 16 
80 0C 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 50 73 16 
80 0C 01 00 00 30 FE B9 43 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 50 73 16 
80 0C 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 50 73 16 
80 0C 06 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 73 16 
87 03 E5 B0 
[2016/10/29 07:09:14.421] 
P 0000 00 000030FEB94320 ; ECM Key0 [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 07:09:14.421] 
P 0000 01 000030FEB94386 ; ECM Key1 [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 07:09:14.421] 
P 00507316 00 C51F9BACEBB8F6 ; EMM Key [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 07:09:14.499] ===========================

[2016/10/29 07:55:52.013] Yes! Key: 9974C140D4598C, Pattern:9FF1430A5926C3
[2016/10/29 07:55:52.106] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 07:55:52.184] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 57 C3 44 00 00 03 
80 93 9D 52 C9 6E 7C DF A7 D9 35 30 54 03 60 5A EE 34 A8 49 6D C7 AF C0 0B 44 F9 
80 93 9E F9 00 08 CC 1F 38 4B CB EA 8E 4B 66 CC 4D B2 76 B4 AE 8A 89 F1 35 E9 C6 
80 93 9C 93 3C EA 88 3A C4 7F 93 25 5B 84 FB BA FB DF 4D 1C FA 4E F5 3E 1C 96 28 
80 93 9F D9 0A 48 7C 17 3C 6B D9 E0 04 42 66 45 8F 32 76 F6 8D 8A 09 51 33 AA 4C 
80 93 9A 82 9C 46 B3 FE 28 61 4B 24 D8 78 CD B1 0B 0C D2 86 14 B2 4D 87 F1 64 61 
D3 A9 24 01 
[2016/10/29 07:55:52.652] =======False Positive Key==========
[2016/10/29 08:08:26.319] Yes! Key: 8BA9185B621EEB, Pattern:23A209E2A02F8E
[2016/10/29 08:08:26.475] FileName: EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin
[2016/10/29 08:08:26.475] Found Packet:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 42 DE 66 00 00 03 
80 F8 BA CC 1A D6 42 3B C7 C6 24 6D 6E DB 7A 83 4F B5 EC F5 62 46 D6 E4 E6 89 BE 
80 F8 B8 CB 10 C3 2F 2B F1 6B 90 12 4A AC B1 0C 32 F2 BF 16 B9 01 24 A6 9B C3 0C 
80 F8 BB C4 0B D6 01 7B 85 EC 9E A4 0A 64 1B B2 89 7B 79 A5 29 EA 40 AB 72 A3 B5 
80 F8 B9 EF 0A 66 66 3E 31 28 84 11 5F AE F0 A6 66 63 E3 12 88 41 15 F6 32 F1 FA 
80 F8 BC EA 02 F8 EE BC B9 C9 23 A2 09 E2 A0 2F 8E EB CB 9C 92 3A 20 9E 68 16 57 
7B 80 A0 9E 
[2016/10/29 08:08:26.475] This key can decrypt the last part of EMM (from the byte 9 to the end):
F8BCEA02F8EEBCB9C9000000000000000000000000000042DE66
[2016/10/29 08:08:27.084] IsDecrypted: True
[2016/10/29 08:08:27.099] EMM-Key: EEB8BA9F6DD611
[2016/10/29 08:08:27.099] EMM:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 42 DE 66 00 00 03 
80 F8 BA CC 1A D6 42 3B C7 C6 24 6D 6E DB 7A 83 4F B5 EC F5 62 46 D6 E4 E6 89 BE 
80 F8 B8 CB 10 C3 2F 2B F1 6B 90 12 4A AC B1 0C 32 F2 BF 16 B9 01 24 A6 9B C3 0C 
80 F8 BB C4 0B D6 01 7B 85 EC 9E A4 0A 64 1B B2 89 7B 79 A5 29 EA 40 AB 72 A3 B5 
80 F8 B9 EF 0A 66 66 3E 31 28 84 11 5F AE F0 A6 66 63 E3 12 88 41 15 F6 32 F1 FA 
80 F8 BC EA 02 F8 EE BC B9 C9 23 A2 09 E2 A0 2F 8E EB CB 9C 92 3A 20 9E 68 16 57 
7B 80 A0 9E 
[2016/10/29 08:08:27.099] EMM Dec:
82 30 9B 10 99 01 0E 00 00 00 06 8F 00 42 DE 66 00 00 03 
80 0C 00 00 00 30 FE B9 90 39 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 42 DE 66 
80 0C 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 42 DE 66 
80 0C 01 00 00 30 FE B9 90 9F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 42 DE 66 
80 0C 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 42 DE 66 
80 0C 06 C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 42 DE 66 
7B 80 A0 9E 
[2016/10/29 08:08:27.099] 
P 0000 00 000030FEB99039 ; ECM Key0 [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 08:08:27.115] 
P 0000 01 000030FEB9909F ; ECM Key1 [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 08:08:27.115] 
P 0042DE66 00 EEB8BA9F6DD611 ; EMM Key [Expired, EMM_PID_005A_[NHL HD]_10_28_2016 10-27-25 PM.bin]
[2016/10/29 08:08:27.177] ===========================
 

kebien

Registered
Messages
1,329
It means it did not find valid keys for the time you left it running.
keep on running longer and might find good keys.
 

dssnosher

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Messages
58
Perhaps I am not doing it properly in PVH 2.1 software? I basically load the bin and once its done indexing(leaving everything default) in packets with patterns tab i press the PLAY button. Is this the correct procedure? It's been running 12h on latest i7 with not luck
 

kebien

Registered
Messages
1,329
By experience,some searches take days until a good key is found.
You are doing it as it should be.
You can speed up by changing values,read the threads about PVHE,will help you understand
 

dssnosher

Registered
Messages
58
By experience,some searches take days until a good key is found.
You are doing it as it should be.
You can speed up by changing values,read the threads about PVHE,will help you understand

Can you please point me in the right direction to find PVHE threads? Can't seem to find any. Thanks in advance.
 

Stefan2k16

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Messages
44
Any chance PVHE could support multiple CUDA devices or at least allow you to select which device to use in a system with multiple CUDA cards? I have a system with 2 GTX480s and 2 GTX 750ti cards. one of the 480s is the primary display adapter and has the monitor connected to it and the software seems to by default select it. I suspect one of the 750Ti's would yield better performance and definitely run cooler and use less power. So, being able to select the CUDA device could be a handy feature for those with multiple cards. It could also perhaps be used to run multiple instance of the software with each instances using a different card and searching a different predefined range to speed up the finding of keys.
 

dale_para_bajo

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Messages
646
Regards this
http://www.sat-universe.com/showpost.php?p=2036744516&postcount=760

Lets see if we can help our friends

NSS 12 57.0E Sports 24 EMM. remember to rename to *.bin

http://27.116.60.254:8000/sport24_nss12_57.0e_4138R15561.rar

Thanks

At the moment I am in NONE Trust Anyone mode. So when I see this link to private servers I do question myself!

I do want to see some one to post a log of the Full transponder like 30 seconds so it does not get too big. Use TSWriter2, do not forget to disable all plugin and modules. So No Vplug nor PVUEmu.

I like to see how similar is this commented stream to the one in the very 1rst post of this Thread. Thanks ahead. Please use public sheared host that do not require signing like zippyshare or anything you like.
 

dahaka

Registered
Messages
700
Regards this
http://www.sat-universe.com/showpost.php?p=2036744516&postcount=760



At the moment I am in NONE Trust Anyone mode. So when I see this link to private servers I do question myself!

I do want to see some one to post a log of the Full transponder like 30 seconds so it does not get too big. Use TSWriter2, do not forget to disable all plugin and modules. So No Vplug nor PVUEmu.

I like to see how similar is this commented stream to the one in the very 1rst post of this Thread. Thanks ahead. Please use public sheared host that do not require signing like zippyshare or anything you like.

57E 4138 R 15561 QPSK (C Band) :( , for now i have only KU Band .
 

fiji

Member
Messages
1,074
Regards this
http://www.sat-universe.com/showpost.php?p=2036744516&postcount=760



At the moment I am in NONE Trust Anyone mode. So when I see this link to private servers I do question myself!

I do want to see some one to post a log of the Full transponder like 30 seconds so it does not get too big. Use TSWriter2, do not forget to disable all plugin and modules. So No Vplug nor PVUEmu.

I like to see how similar is this commented stream to the one in the very 1rst post of this Thread. Thanks ahead. Please use public sheared host that do not require signing like zippyshare or anything you like.

This File An Old Logs Useless Upload Latest bin file Here 57E C-band
 

dale_para_bajo

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646
As many time I had done please received my apologies. I did post http://www.sat-universe.com/showpost.php?p=2036744050&postcount=162

So I hate when I see false information. This time I may had. I did post that base on the rumors I was given. But to be true I was never given a log nor some one posted a good log here. So It was based on the rumor, the weird last 2 weeks I had, and the failure of the test on a key sharing private system.

Well it is true that their is morphed weird stream on Asia Arch. I was ask to look at that last week.

But yesterday I was given a 30 second log of 34.5W and I do not see any of the morphed stream. So my comment on the cancer spreading is a false alarm. Still I guess there is a new challenge in 57E that some one have to look into it. My best guess is that EMM logs are worthless as they may be posting Expired UAs while holding the Valid ones. But without useful log that is my best guess.

In general I still think you guys need to think in a less public method for sharing info on this high value providers. Good luck.
 

drhans

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116
My best guess is that EMM logs are worthless as they may be posting Expired UAs while holding the Valid ones.

I think that is very unlikely. If you try to decrypt just one EMM, it becomes obvious what's wrong here and it's not just that the particular UAs would be expired. And since I doubt they can do any update of the ISE, my guess is that it's all in the firmware.
 

kebien

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drhans
Not sure what you think can be done in firmware,but for sure any decryption done in firmware is moot,specially knowing the firmware is already known,new updates are not secret,and most everything is open.
The ISE is like any smartcard,can be re-written or can be simply swapped with an updated one.In this way they send no secret in the stream.
Whatever you think they are doing in firmware I personally think you are wrong.
 

dale_para_bajo

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646
My suggestion is not to focus in what we may say wrong but too look what we get right.

I had said many time I own no C-Band antenna,. I depend on the logs posted here. Well 1rst I got only on log privately just as I ask, 30 second of the full transponder. As the intention was to compare the new stream with what I new of the morphed. For that I only have thanks.

From that small log I can not distinguish any imperfection on EMM
Code:
47405A15 008230 9B 5099 01 0E00 3500 068F 00000000 000003
805E73A2D0FFD721514A6CB40F0651DDCA9611A04B15E9666405CD
805EAED50214006936D869087B2525805F92DFCA2DD88DF7144C23
805E78D3259FE717EC2C7D24690CBE7D36C65FE1384D0261FA1C6E
805EA999E2DCE8C41A83AC99D8BF7087D42F4BEE86C52129E1C04A
805EAA7E10D25AADD394BF3BD411B46983EADCBF2FAEE61D9D3CFE
56A31446

"If you try to decrypt just one EMM, it becomes obvious what's wrong"

I do not see the obvious. But to decrypt a EMM I need the EMM-Key and I own any of those. Maybe if I had a valid key then I will see the obvious.

ECMs just look also with good structure.

I do not see obvious colibri patterns neither. If I have time I will try to dust my PVU tools and refresh my mind. As always I am no expert I just like to spend time studding this crypt changes. More logs will help I guess. Please post any log in none passworded public shared host.

Now please note I did not say all is OK. I know people are complaining so something most be change. But I do not see it at this point.
 

drhans

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116
As an example, here are 5 decrypted EMM blocks from 5 different EMM messages for 5 different UAs:

Code:
0c 01 5a 11 ec 8a 6a 92 b6 40 ef f9 1a 0d 43 2a 6c 59 24 00 42 19 c5 b5 4b 23
0c 01 5a a7 9f de 91 e4 03 cf 95 b1 a1 cf 1c 11 99 78 3f f0 4f bc 33 90 39 45 
0c 01 5a ac 14 50 37 2b 96 8e c9 f1 c9 ff ff 96 5c 46 ee 6f 6c f3 16 6f fc 15 
0c 01 59 47 8e 0b 59 a3 37 f7 be 60 0a 6f 0f 00 02 6e 86 a0 81 fa c5 b5 e1 b9 
0c 01 5a f9 f2 33 8c 03 d4 50 82 66 eb 2c f8 17 63 1b c0 b6 6e 95 07 aa 1d d4

So in this case, 4 in 5 start with 0c 01 5a which is interesting but probably doesn't help, however, it makes me believe EMM keys are still OK. Just the encrypted EMM block seems to be double encrypted now, although the first 1-3 bytes aren't affected for some reason. I still believe the ISE has nothing to do with this. If they could rewrite or change the chip, I doubt the old EMM keys would still be giving a result like this.
 

dale_para_bajo

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I wanted to post but was busy today.
I had no reasons nor data to go against your findings. I can easily assume kebien had no knowledge of this as to understand his point of view. Still assuming this provider has a limited specialized maritime customers I do not understand how you guys make so many assumptions. Please do not answer that, no need and unimportant data to resolve the problem. Just only my own honest curiosity. Regards me I can easily accept same hardware firmware upgrade or even a new External Card issue. But why no one notified seem software update in the stream.

Now if you decrypt different EMMs for same UA will you get always same results? Are EMMs for your UA are not changing?

Some sort of ECM Brute Force seems to me more easily attack at the moment.

If I had time I will be looking into a crazy Idea I had that I put away when I got tired of powervu.
 

drhans

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116
I wanted to post but was busy today.
I had no reasons nor data to go against your findings. I can easily assume kebien had no knowledge of this as to understand his point of view. Still assuming this provider has a limited specialized maritime customers I do not understand how you guys make so many assumptions. Please do not answer that, no need and unimportant data to resolve the problem. Just only my own honest curiosity. Regards me I can easily accept same hardware firmware upgrade or even a new External Card issue. But why no one notified seem software update in the stream.

Now if you decrypt different EMMs for same UA will you get always same results? Are EMMs for your UA are not changing?

Some sort of ECM Brute Force seems to me more easily attack at the moment.

If I had time I will be looking into a crazy Idea I had that I put away when I got tired of powervu.

According to the ECM logs, there's no external card:

80 30 3D 50 37 20 0E 00 E0 00 00 D1 B8 00 6B...

I checked encrypted EMMs for one UA and that was a good point because the EMM packet is always completely different. Not just the EMM block payload but also two bytes in the headers have changed. Now if I was a dumb PowerVu developer, I'd use those 2 bytes to

1) determine that the EMM is double-enrypted (Tag 50, used to be 10)
2) and if tag = 50, then I would use 8th byte from EMM table (50, ED, F5...) to find the corresponding key somewhere. This byte used to be 00 before. And, the easiest thing for a dumb developer would be look that key up in the firmware. Something like Tandberg, right?

example of new and old EMM messages for one randomly selected UA:

NEW:
Code:
47 40 5A 1F 00 82 30 9B [COLOR="Red"]50[/COLOR] 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]50[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 5E 33 EB B3 F5 4A 8B 70 2E F6 4B 4F 2A DF 88 EC B5 7A 82 D2 B2 54 4C 42 6A 80 01 95 82 E8 C5 23 FA E5 88 13 41 E9 E7 86 65 E4 C1 C7 D2 80 38 E8 1A E7 4C 32 80 01 81 9A 22 40 CB 3B 36 75 9C B6 6A AB 35 E1 DC D2 35 96 E6 65 1D 0E 9D FA 84 80 01 97 86 C0 C7 C9 BA C8 81 4B 5A AB 4D 39 4B 6E EE 8F 3E 53 98 37 34 88 42 3F 80 01 94 BC E6 4B 96 1E 45 10 4F 37 A7 48 AB 13 61 48 98 D5 EF A0 38 4A CF 78 5F 03 3D 41 AC
47 40 5A 15 00 82 30 9B [COLOR="Red"]50[/COLOR] 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]ED[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 E3 BC D0 4B 96 1E BA 97 2C 3C A7 48 42 13 61 25 98 2B EF A0 B5 4A CF 1E 5F 80 01 95 0F E8 C5 23 FA 8D 88 13 41 E9 00 86 65 E8 C1 C7 D2 47 38 E8 1A 5E 4C 32 80 01 02 33 EB B3 FC 4A B6 70 4D F7 4B 4F A0 DF 88 EC B5 67 F5 D2 37 AB 4C 42 6A 80 01 90 91 22 40 44 3B 36 8B 9D B6 6A AB BD E1 DC D2 A9 96 2E 65 1D 5D 9D 85 84 80 01 97 87 11 C7 AC BA C8 17 EF 5A AB 4D 39 4B 6E 3A 0A 3E 53 98 A3 D7 88 5C 3F 22 45 D9 D3
47 40 5A 1B 00 82 30 9B [COLOR="Red"]50[/COLOR] 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]F5[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 52 33 EB B3 F5 4A 39 70 2E 92 4B 4F 01 DF 88 EC B5 D6 82 D2 8E 54 4C 42 6A 80 01 94 EB D0 4B 96 1E 3E 97 2C 37 A7 0E AB 13 41 25 98 D5 38 A0 29 4A 23 1E 5F 80 01 63 61 E8 C5 F3 FA F2 88 FC 41 E9 D1 5A 65 63 C1 C7 D2 27 38 E8 95 8A 4C 32 80 01 90 FF 22 40 E3 3B 36 C4 9D B6 6A AB BD E1 DC D2 8C 96 2E 65 1D 64 9D 81 84 80 01 97 87 86 C7 AC BA C8 BC 9C 5A AB 4D 39 4B 6E 02 0A 3E 53 98 C1 D7 88 85 3F 33 F6 2A F9

OLD:
Code:
47 40 5A 15 00 82 30 9B [COLOR="Red"]10[/COLOR] 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]00[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 97 97 2E D3 67 66 3F 6C 63 51 35 78 8E 5D 84 0F E3 95 3C 71 EA A0 96 FB DC 80 01 94 05 3A 40 94 E0 9A C9 D6 0C 92 D7 2F B7 D7 54 9A E1 4A A8 90 31 76 A1 52 80 01 90 9A 23 10 B1 3E E3 11 23 A1 29 EE 88 85 30 BB AF 20 80 F1 28 00 28 4A FF 80 01 95 F1 F6 D6 DB 17 95 5B 1C 79 D0 14 BD 5A 50 C9 47 B6 20 E7 9C 0F 0E 91 E4 80 01 96 4B F6 85 F5 42 9B 2D F2 DF 3A 88 A1 59 71 42 5F FB 0A 60 3E 1E DC AA E0 7E 76 67 6B
47 40 5A 1D 00 82 30 9B [COLOR="Red"]10[/COLOR] 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]00[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 96 4B F6 85 F5 42 9B 2D F2 DF 3A 88 A1 59 71 42 5F FB 0A 60 3E 1E DC AA E0 80 01 95 F1 F6 D6 DB 17 95 5B 1C 79 D0 14 BD 5A 50 C9 47 B6 20 E7 9C 0F 0E 91 E4 80 01 94 05 3A 40 94 E0 9A C9 D6 0C 92 D7 2F B7 D7 54 9A E1 4A A8 90 31 76 A1 52 80 01 97 97 2E D3 67 66 3F 6C 63 51 35 78 8E 5D 84 0F E3 95 3C 71 EA A0 96 FB DC 80 01 90 9A 23 10 B1 3E E3 11 23 A1 29 EE 88 85 30 BB AF 20 80 F1 28 00 28 4A FF 84 E4 F0 3D
47 40 5A 15 00 82 30 9B [COLOR="Red"]10[/COLOR] 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]00[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 94 05 3A 40 94 E0 9A C9 D6 0C 92 D7 2F B7 D7 54 9A E1 4A A8 90 31 76 A1 52 80 01 95 F1 F6 D6 DB 17 95 5B 1C 79 D0 14 BD 5A 50 C9 47 B6 20 E7 9C 0F 0E 91 E4 80 01 97 97 2E D3 67 66 3F 6C 63 51 35 78 8E 5D 84 0F E3 95 3C 71 EA A0 96 FB DC 80 01 96 4B F6 85 F5 42 9B 2D F2 DF 3A 88 A1 59 71 42 5F FB 0A 60 3E 1E DC AA E0 80 01 90 9A 23 10 B1 3E E3 11 23 A1 29 EE 88 85 30 BB AF 20 80 F1 28 00 28 4A FF 35 41 69 98
 

drhans

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And guess what, if you log long enough to find several EMM messages using the same value in the "8th byte", the encrypted EMMs are exactly the same (within one ECM-key cycle). This only confirms that this byte is the key to all this mystery (or rather the pointer to the key, right...)

one example:

Code:
47 40 5A 13 00 82 30 9B 50 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]78[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 D9 9A 22 40 AD 3B 64 75 9D 1E 6A AB 27 E1 DC D2 35 C9 2E 65 28 33 9D FA 84 80 01 97 07 C0 C7 AC BA 9B 9C 4B 5A AB B0 39 4B 87 EE 0A 3E D5 98 37 D7 33 55 3F 80 01 70 61 E8 C5 4C FA F2 88 9D 41 E9 D1 BB 65 63 C1 C7 D2 AA 38 E8 48 8A 4C 32 80 01 94 14 D0 4B 0C 1E 45 C8 2C 37 A7 48 AB 13 61 25 AD D5 EF A0 29 CA CF 4D 5F 80 01 96 33 16 B3 F5 4A B6 99 A8 F7 4B 4F 4F DF 88 57 B5 67 82 D2 D2 54 4C 2D 6A 1E AF AA 58
47 40 5A 13 00 82 30 9B 50 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]78[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 D9 9A 22 40 AD 3B 64 75 9D 1E 6A AB 27 E1 DC D2 35 C9 2E 65 28 33 9D FA 84 80 01 97 07 C0 C7 AC BA 9B 9C 4B 5A AB B0 39 4B 87 EE 0A 3E D5 98 37 D7 33 55 3F 80 01 70 61 E8 C5 4C FA F2 88 9D 41 E9 D1 BB 65 63 C1 C7 D2 AA 38 E8 48 8A 4C 32 80 01 94 14 D0 4B 0C 1E 45 C8 2C 37 A7 48 AB 13 61 25 AD D5 EF A0 29 CA CF 4D 5F 80 01 96 33 16 B3 F5 4A B6 99 A8 F7 4B 4F 4F DF 88 57 B5 67 82 D2 D2 54 4C 2D 6A 1E AF AA 58

another example for the same UA:

Code:
47 40 5A 1B 00 82 30 9B 50 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]F5[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 52 33 EB B3 F5 4A 39 70 2E 92 4B 4F 01 DF 88 EC B5 D6 82 D2 8E 54 4C 42 6A 80 01 94 EB D0 4B 96 1E 3E 97 2C 37 A7 0E AB 13 41 25 98 D5 38 A0 29 4A 23 1E 5F 80 01 63 61 E8 C5 F3 FA F2 88 FC 41 E9 D1 5A 65 63 C1 C7 D2 27 38 E8 95 8A 4C 32 80 01 90 FF 22 40 E3 3B 36 C4 9D B6 6A AB BD E1 DC D2 8C 96 2E 65 1D 64 9D 81 84 80 01 97 87 86 C7 AC BA C8 BC 9C 5A AB 4D 39 4B 6E 02 0A 3E 53 98 C1 D7 88 85 3F 33 F6 2A F9
47 40 5A 15 00 82 30 9B 50 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]F5[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 82 00 00 03 80 01 52 33 EB B3 F5 4A 39 70 2E 92 4B 4F 01 DF 88 EC B5 D6 82 D2 8E 54 4C 42 6A 80 01 94 EB D0 4B 96 1E 3E 97 2C 37 A7 0E AB 13 41 25 98 D5 38 A0 29 4A 23 1E 5F 80 01 63 61 E8 C5 F3 FA F2 88 FC 41 E9 D1 5A 65 63 C1 C7 D2 27 38 E8 95 8A 4C 32 80 01 90 FF 22 40 E3 3B 36 C4 9D B6 6A AB BD E1 DC D2 8C 96 2E 65 1D 64 9D 81 84 80 01 97 87 86 C7 AC BA C8 BC 9C 5A AB 4D 39 4B 6E 02 0A 3E 53 98 C1 D7 88 85 3F 33 F6 2A F9

another example for another UA:

Code:
47 40 5A 15 00 82 30 9B 50 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="Blue"]46[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 8B 00 00 03 80 A0 F4 F3 6D 48 A7 5C DB F0 72 F3 86 4A B1 3B B1 D9 F4 31 7B 14 21 2B 10 08 66 80 A0 7C 32 9C EC 1E F1 C4 A6 20 07 6E 40 1C 4B A2 D9 EC CE A6 D1 46 8C 87 2E 81 80 A0 CF 93 22 1D E8 0C D6 E4 C5 1E 7E 7A 53 5E 02 83 C4 1D 97 52 7F 7F 12 FD 5C 80 A0 7E AA B2 D6 3B BF 3B 0F 4A FF EA 48 9F 30 83 DF AC 50 72 F3 A1 DA 67 28 54 80 A0 7F B9 51 46 A6 E9 42 74 F9 66 25 6F C6 42 AF B2 A2 07 50 04 52 39 27 89 91 78 F5 8B 78
47 40 5A 13 00 82 30 9B 50 99 01 0E 00 [COLOR="blue"]46[/COLOR] 00 06 8F 00 54 13 8B 00 00 03 80 A0 F4 F3 6D 48 A7 5C DB F0 72 F3 86 4A B1 3B B1 D9 F4 31 7B 14 21 2B 10 08 66 80 A0 7C 32 9C EC 1E F1 C4 A6 20 07 6E 40 1C 4B A2 D9 EC CE A6 D1 46 8C 87 2E 81 80 A0 CF 93 22 1D E8 0C D6 E4 C5 1E 7E 7A 53 5E 02 83 C4 1D 97 52 7F 7F 12 FD 5C 80 A0 7E AA B2 D6 3B BF 3B 0F 4A FF EA 48 9F 30 83 DF AC 50 72 F3 A1 DA 67 28 54 80 A0 7F B9 51 46 A6 E9 42 74 F9 66 25 6F C6 42 AF B2 A2 07 50 04 52 39 27 89 91 78 F5 8B 78

these pairs come about an hour apart, which would also indicate the ECM key changes are now less frequent
 

kebien

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1,329
I think is wrong to think the ISE has nothing to do with all this,so far the only decryption element in powervu is the ISE,what make you think this has changed?.
There is for sure an algorithm change,meaning is different from the one in use now,probably those bytes you found are pointing to use it.
 

drhans

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116
I think is wrong to think the ISE has nothing to do with all this,so far the only decryption element in powervu is the ISE,what make you think this has changed?.
There is for sure an algorithm change,meaning is different from the one in use now,probably those bytes you found are pointing to use it.

Yes that's a perfectly valid point of course. But there are now only 2 ways to figure this out:

1) Colibri must tell us more about EMM double decryption. Maybe because it was never done, he didn't bother describing this, how would the ISE do it. The only time he mentioned it was when describing the command 04 found in the firmware.

2) Log the traffic between the IRD and ISE to see if double decryption is in use. If it is, well, then again we need Colibri to share additional secrets of the ISE.

But what doesn't seem right to me with this theory is that the whole EMM packet is never sent from the IRD to the ISE, only the EMM payloads are so those new bytes in the EMM headers don't really seem to be intended for the ISE but rather for the IRD alone, yet the IRD is not the one determining whether to use ISE double EMM decrypt command or not!

Somehow I find it hard to accept that the ISE would be capable of learning new tricks. If anything, then the double EMM decryption was activated - but if that's the case - what took so long? Are there still unexplored ISE capabilities? There could be - for example, I also assumed the s-boxes in use are fixed and can't change - but that was proven wrong when MTN switched from sbox 0 to sbox A. But, they didn't add any sbox "B" which would still suggest the ISE is what it is and it can't really change.
 
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