############ CAK7 MERLIN MODULE ####################
###### First things first this took time to study and reverse, its purpose is to show that such CA access has big flaws that can be exploited. It just proves nothing is safe or not meant to be safe #####
MERLIN UNIVERSAL RSA KEYS For Generic mode
[PROVID 3411 HD+]
EXP 010001
MOD1 9DF5D60B66A6F839CDA448C9AC59E5AFE9FFA6BFB2AB141003 FADD94D47F2EB047764FCE1A62F32B51F1E892171894558B63 F55C0096FA36D4210B634358A3C11323A322DC3BC6040E09E5 79466CF384598C357945FE32C7711D1F59EBA9C44194EC02DF 561C1782B14A6F043BA81E63
MOD2 86713F416E581727B9D5A1E365876EE6C92CA8D6EC62878BA4 36A114C8092BFA125189DF6CE1C4BA5D0A6A4F7A96785F5AB9 5E511C42E6D08894E5257A907DF50314BD3B71751E02E4AA8B D6287937E9019E52D46D417C8E93FBB0EC2222F6C67EE11CCE 239DF10ABE01F947AC8FA41B
DATA88 FF4D54D984C85F83E0441945FC56B213243ABA7FBC24D05B9D 7EEECE530980AE6B5AEE3A41CE0975EFA6BF1E984FA4116F43 CACDD06E69FA25C1F9118E7AD019C0EB00C0572A40B7FF8ABB 2521D750E735A185CDA6D3DEB33D16D494768A828C7025D400 D0648C26B95F44FF7370AB43F568A2B1B58A8E025F9606A8C3 4F15CD99C269B83568114C
DATA50 B6711C868C3EE72533A4E08C1364B83AEEFDEBE9FB54156A87 76D872CBC41FF2E5EA2CBAF4F26A58C521EC53E310FC494354 E49ECE6CD0F9631B724FAB0C8BAEC1F66C346AD2DB1CB3871A F44C1E1592
MOD50 DB9E1F1BD23C6153444E444D8E6C471E162EC63C599D44F476 E0D40C3840E0FDB7B63D174DD73B575543983F2F2DFB94E364 4958AE642C91636A6BE55528478EB7A422479598C68E6F1FC9 D647BBC4D5
exp 00112233445566770011223344556677
Mod1 = Used for RSA decrypt of data DT05_00 and DT05_10 (this 2 cmds are used in smartcards with global pairing, this means card can be swapped to another STB from same provider)
Mod2 = used for RSA decrypt of CMD dt05_20 (This cmd is only available in smartcards with unique pairing table) This gets 50% of the DT05_20 Process done, the other 50% is to generate the MDC2
Signature and also to calculate the Flag58 3DES SW key.
Data88 = First 0x18 hex bytes are expanded using NNRSA idea expand which will generate 2 Prime numbers 0x34 bytes each. and then calculated to get 0x68 bytes Layer68 RSA for decryption data.
CMD03 ( This cmd involves alot of calculation data done previously on previous cmds)
The CMD$03 consits of 3 Layers
Layer60, Layer68, Layer6C after layer6c gets calculated this final data is then encrypted with AES key and sent to smartcard, smartcard replies back, and we apply decrypt with RSA Layer68
Generated from Layer68 ( this mode for Generic pairing only) then after decrypted 0x68bytes we extract the 0x50 byte block inside and decrypt it using Data50+mod50, and decrypted result 0x50 final
we apply MDC2 hash to obtain new AES Session Key.
If using Unique pairing data changes instead of using key data88 first 0x18 for idea expand, we use 016c block decrypted key 35(88) first 0x18 bytes apply NNRSA idea expand to generate
the 0x68 RSA key to decrypt Layer68 from CMD03. and after building up layer6c we encrypt AES and send to smartcard, and smartcard reply back 0x60 bytes encrypted only.
To decrypt this 0x60 bytes we use our 016c block dump RSA 34(60) key. after extracting decrypted data we pick block 0x50 and apply RSA decrypt with Data50 and Mod50, final 0x50 decrypted
are then hashed MDC2 to obtain the new Session key AES
Layer60--> consists of 5 different data 000000FF + MOD50 + IRD + DATA1 + DATA2 (Data1+Data2 are data reply from CMD02 and CMD0E send and received data from card)
Then RSA decrypt using RSA60 result data from DT05_00 decryption)===> Final Block 0x60 bytes.
Layer68--> consists of adding 000000FF + CARD Serial No. + Final block 0x60 byte, (then apply RSA decrypt modulus using RSA68 key, result of IdeaExpand of first 0x18bytes of key data88,or 35(88) ).
==== final result block68 final.
Layer6c--> consists of adding 000000FF + block68 (then apply RSA decrypt with RSA6C this RSA6C is obtained of decryption of DT05_10 data ) and final result block final block6c
==== this block6c will be encrypted with AES128 and it will be sent to smartcard using CMD$03. (The card will reply back 0x68 bytes encrypted RSA)
this 0x68 bytes will be decrypted with RSA68 for generic pairing), if unique pairing, card will reply back 0x68 but first 0x08 are not encrypted, so only last 0x60 will be
it will use RSA 34(60) UNIQUE from 016c block to decrypt this last 0x60 bytes.
After generic or unique decrypt done, we filter inside block of 0x50 bytes and apply RSA decrypt with Data50 + 112233445566xxxxxxxxxxxxx = final block 0x50 bytes decrypted.
Then we apply MDC2 hash and obtain last 0x10 bytes which will be next Session Key used for AES encrypt and decrypt of next cmds.
This key will be valid for a certain period of time, untill one new ECM will bring a new status flag warning the system to renew the SK and the new init process will start again
DT05_00,10,20 cmd02/0E, cmd03 buildup and generate decrypt for new SK aes.
Notes:
1- if card log shows only DT05_00 and DT05_10 cmds (it indicates card will only run in generic pairing global mode, this means it can work in any stb from the specific provider matching)
card will use CMD02 to send the 0x70 bytes of DATA88 block.
2- if card log shows dt05_00 + dt05_10 + dt05_20 (it indicates card will run in both modes, generic and unique, and indicates that unique pairing mode is active, so it will need extra
keysets stored inside decrypted 016C block, such as key34(60) 3des key 33(10)aka boxkey IDEA, Key35 (88) used for unique pairing mode)
3- Key33(10) ideakey will be used on specific step of dt05_20 decrypt data this will be IDEA encrypt + xor, to generate block of data which will contain the MDC2 signature check + last 0x10bytes
3DES S/W key flag58.
4- CMD02 For generic
CMD0E For Unique pairing
Both cmds contain a data1 and data2 result its like a counter allways send data1, card reply data1+1 increment. (this 2 blocks of 0x04 will be used on build up of layer60)
After new session key is generated we have the DT04 read out up to DTFF .. and also the ECM uses CMD05 , ECM also has flags to indicate session key renewall, and also has limit size cmd
structure that needs to be sent correctly to the card otherwise the card will crash.
1st Step DT09
2nd Step DT05
3rd Step CMD02/0E
4th Step CMD$03
5Th step DT04/0C Setup Structure for flags ECM and EMM
6Th Step ECM CMD$05
LETS TAKE A LOOK AT SOME REAL LOGGING EXAMPLE INFORMATION AND PAIRING PURPOSES...
SEQ CMD Lc DATA Le
# switch rom
CAM->CARD 000001 01 01 95 10
CAM<-CARD 000001 81 00
# Required to use CRC32 checksum code in order to enable full encrypt Plain CMD data, to send CMD to smartcard fully encrypted.
# dt request
############ 00 00 01 ################################################## ############
CAM------------------------------>
CMD Sequence---------------------> 00 00 01
Type-----------------------------> 04
Len------------------------------> 04
Data ----------------------------> 00 00 00 09 ( DT09)
rlen 10 ( expects 0x10 byte reply from card )
CARD Reply----------------------->
CMD Sequence---------------------> 00 00 01
Type-----------------------------> 84
Len------------------------------> 07 (Card reply only 7 bytes)
Card-INS-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A3 (card ins total times processed)
DT09-----------------------------> 09 (DT09)
Bytes requested------------------> 08 (requests STB to send cmd again)
Reset ---------------------------> F0 00
############ 00 00 02 ################################################## ############
CAM------------------------------>
CMD Sequence---------------------> 00 00 02
Type-----------------------------> 04
Len------------------------------> 04
Data-----------------------------> 00 00 00 09 (DT09)
Rlen 20 ( Requests 0x20 bytes read out ) but its AES so it needs to be multiple of 0x10)
CARD-----------------------------> 00 00 02
Type-----------------------------> 84
Len------------------------------> 11 (Card replies 0x11 hex bytes)
Card-INS-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A3
DT09-----------------------------> 09
DT09_Lenght----------------------> 08
F0 00 ---------------------------> Reset
---------------------------------> 00 00
Provider ID----------------------> 00 34 11 ( Provider SyS ID )
---------------------------------> 00 03 02
---------------------------------> FB C4
############ 00 00 03 ################################################## ############
CAM-SEND-TO-CARD-----------------> 00 00 03
Type-----------------------------> 04
Len------------------------------> 04
Card-INS-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A4
DT09-----------------------------> 09
rlen ----------------------------> 10 ( requested 0x10 bytes from the card )
CARD-Reply-----------------------> 00 00 03
Type-----------------------------> 84
LEN------------------------------> 07
Card-INS-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A4
DT09-----------------------------> 09
DT09_Len-------------------------> 0D (Card replies real cmd size 0D tells CAM to request cmd again with 0x20)
Reset----------------------------> F0 00
############# 00 00 04 ################################################## ###########
CAM-SEND-TO-CARD----------------->
Cmd Sequence---------------------> 00 00 04
Type-----------------------------> 04
LEN------------------------------> 04
Card-INS-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A4 ( Card ins 932 times)
DT09-----------------------------> 09 20 (requested 0x20 bytes from the card)
CARD-REPLY----------------------->
CMD Sequence --------------------> 00 00 04
TYPE-----------------------------> 84
LEN------------------------------> 16 ( 0x16 hex bytes )
Card-INS-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A4
DT09-----------------------------> 09
DT09_LEN-------------------------> 0D ( 0x0D bytes cmd length)
Reset----------------------------> F0 00
---------------------------------> 00 00 00
Provider ID ---------------------> 34 11
---------------------------------> FE 08
---------------------------------> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
############### 00 00 05 ################################################## ########
CAM-SEND-TO-CARD----------------->
CMD Sequence---------------------> 00 00 05
Type-----------------------------> 04
LEN------------------------------> 04
Card-INS-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A5
DT09-----------------------------> 09
Rlen-----------------------------> 10 (Requests from the card 0x10 bytes reply)
CARD-Reply-----------------------> 00 00 05
Type-----------------------------> 84
LEN------------------------------> 07
Card-Ins-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A5
DT09-----------------------------> 09
DT09_LEN-------------------------> 0D (Tells CAM real size 0x0D to issue new Cmd)
Reset----------------------------> F000
################ 00 00 06 ################################################## #######
CAM-SEND-TO-CARD----------------->
CMD Sequence---------------------> 00 00 06
Type-----------------------------> 04
LEN------------------------------> 04
Card-Ins-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A5
DT09-----------------------------> 09
rlen 20 (Request card reply 0x20 size)
CARD-REPLY----------------------->
CMD-Sequence---------------------> 00 00 06
Type-----------------------------> 84
LEN------------------------------> 16
Card-Ins-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A5 ( Card Ins 933 )
DT09-----------------------------> 09
DT09_LEN-------------------------> 0D
Reset----------------------------> F000
---------------------------------> 0000
0D_Data--------------------------> 00 34 11 FD080000000000000000
################## 00 00 07 ################################################## ######
CAM-SEND-TO-CARD----------------->
CM-SEQUENCE----------------------> 00 00 07
TYPE-----------------------------> 04
LEN------------------------------> 04
Card-Ins-Processed-Counter-------> 00 03 A6
DT09-----------------------------> 09
rlen-----------------------------> 10 (Request card reply 0x10 bytes size)
CARD-Reply----------------------->
CMD-Sequence---------------------> 00 00 07
Type-----------------------------> 84
LEN------------------------------> 07
Reset counter Finish DT$xx Read--> FF FF FF 00 00 FF FF
DT09 reads Provider main SysID
INIT CMD DT05 Sequence to build up of new Pairing Init Steps............................................. .........
Required for Processing DT05 structure RSA_MOD1 Static from STB flash, and RSA Mod2 Static from STB flash and RSA_MOD88 generic
This 2 0x70 RSAs are a Result of Xoring other 4 blocks of 0x70 bytes stored in STB firmware Flash.
Block 1 XOR Block 2 = RSA_MOD_1 Provider STB manufacturer specific global key ( This key is only used on DT05_00 and DT05_10 RSA decrypt steps for Global Generic Pairing Mode)
Block 3 xor Block 4 = RSA_MOD_2 Provider Specific STB Global RSA key ( This key is Unique for Each Provider and this key is used only for STB using Unique Pairing with CMD DT05_20)
Block 4 xor Block 5 = RSA_MOD88 used for CMD$03 steps
This 2 Keys are necessary for decrypting Generic and Unique pairing table steps from Cmds DT05_00, DT05_10, DT05_20
Also CMD DT05_20 which is used for Unique pairing ( it also involves alot more steps and calculations RSA using also the Unique Pairing data keysets from inside block 016c IDEA rsa encrypted)
Step 1 Decrypt RSA block of Card reply DT05_20 0x70 bytes. and stored decrypted result.
Step 2 get Rsa decrypted result of step1 and split in 8 byte blocks
Step 3 Get unique merlin_bokey decrypted from 016c nagra PK dump stored in offset 33 10 = 33(10) xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx and apply encrypt idea + xor on previous 8 byte block result
example block1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx , block2 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, block3 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, block4 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
key 3310 idea encrypt block1 = result1
key 3310 idea encrypt block2 = result2 xor block1 = finalresult1
key 3310 idea encrypt block3 = result3 xor block2 = finalresult2
key 3310 idea encrypt block4 = result4 xor block3 = finalresult3
key 3310 idea encrypt block5 = result5 xor block4 = finalresult4
and so on until last round is obtained.
Final block will give you 2 results
result1 data = 0x18 bytes will be expanded using IDEA expansion to obtain P & Q 0x34 keysets and RSA expansion to obtain finaly the 0x68 Modulus N Key (this key will be used for CMD$03 sequence steps)
result2 data = 0x10 (the last 0x10 bytes will be our unique card Software_pairing 3DES_ECB key for Flag$58 (it will be used on old legacy STB that won´t be using chipset cryptohardware 3DES for protecting some channel packages)
===========> Example DT$05_00 Pairing Step1 <======================
################################################## ####### HD+ Generic Pairing log DT05_00 ################################################## ###
STB ===> CARD:
21 00 16 80 CA 00 00 10 EE 62 20 47 87 FF CD D4 3A 70 37 21 10 BD CB A5 A0 D8
CMD Parse:
NAD/PCB/LEN----------------------------------------------> 21 00 16
CLASS HEADER---------------------------------------------> 80 CA 00 00
CMD Size Len---------------------------------------------> 10
Encrypted Data-------------------------------------------> EE 62 20 47 87 FF CD D4 3A 70 37 21 10 BD CB A5
Expected card reply 0xA0 hex-----------------------------> A0
LRC Checksum---------------------------------------------> D8
Decrypted 0x10 byte cmd ---------------------------------> 7A A9 10 6E 00 00 05 04 04 00 00 00 05 CC CC CC
CRC32----------------------------------------------------> 7A A9 10 6E
CMD SEQ--------------------------------------------------> 00 00 05
TYPE-----------------------------------------------------> 04
LEN------------------------------------------------------> 04
DT05-----------------------------------------------------> 00 00 00 05 (DT05)
Padding -------------------------------------------------> CC CC CC
CARD ===> STB:
12 00 A2 FC C6 31 25 97 D5 DC 8A 09 65 82 C4 0C 7C 36 6A AF D6 90 3A 04 4A 8E 7D AD 0E 37 CA B4 1C A5 09 2E 49 97 E7 5E 6A 73 11 66 2C A4 38 90 8B 89 97 8D 7A C8 09 FF 5D 5B 0C 8A 31 6D 02 14 54 EF 62 F2 30 27 21 17 52 03 26 35 27 02 C3 87 33 66 03 44 68 31 12 12 92 05 A7 D5 3F 48 75 DB ED 4D 71 A0 D3 0C 5D DE 9F FA 9C 3A 4E 00 96 A3 AF 6F 79 41 DD E9 FC 6C 53 4D 39 4A 37 7D 5B 28 AB 24 7B 3C A3 FA 13 FC D6 62 3B A6 97 EB 7A F6 FF 27 50 94 C4 E7 41 C7 59 4A B3 11 C3 A5 DD DF 02 EB 7D 90 00 25
CMD Parse:
NAD/PCB/LEN----------------------------------------------> 12 00 A2
Block 0xA0 encrypted Data--------------------------------> FC C6 31 25 97 D5 DC 8A 09 65 82 C4 0C 7C 36 6A
---------------------------------------------------------> AF D6 90 3A 04 4A 8E 7D AD 0E 37 CA B4 1C A5 09
---------------------------------------------------------> 2E 49 97 E7 5E 6A 73 11 66 2C A4 38 90 8B 89 97
---------------------------------------------------------> 8D 7A C8 09 FF 5D 5B 0C 8A 31 6D 02 14 54 EF 62
---------------------------------------------------------> F2 30 27 21 17 52 03 26 35 27 02 C3 87 33 66 03
---------------------------------------------------------> 44 68 31 12 12 92 05 A7 D5 3F 48 75 DB ED 4D 71
---------------------------------------------------------> A0 D3 0C 5D DE 9F FA 9C 3A 4E 00 96 A3 AF 6F 79
---------------------------------------------------------> 41 DD E9 FC 6C 53 4D 39 4A 37 7D 5B 28 AB 24 7B
---------------------------------------------------------> 3C A3 FA 13 FC D6 62 3B A6 97 EB 7A F6 FF 27 50
---------------------------------------------------------> 94 C4 E7 41 C7 59 4A B3 11 C3 A5 DD DF 02 EB 7D
90 00
25
AES decrypted card reply--------------------------------->
CRC32 ---------------------------------------------------> 00 F1 BF A3
CMD SEQ -------------------------------------------------> 00 00 05
TYPE ----------------------------------------------------> 84
LEN -----------------------------------------------------> 8F
Card total INS counter ----------------------------------> 00 00 52
DT$05 ---------------------------------------------------> 05
DT$05_dataLEN -------------------------------------------> 86
Reset ---------------------------------------------------> E0 00 00
Provider Sys ID -----------------------------------------> 00 34 11
DT$05_00 ------------------------------------------------> 00 (DT05_00 indicator)
DT_type -------------------------------------------------> 82 00
Provider Sys ID -----------------------------------------> 00 34 11
Block1 Chipered 0x70 bytes ------------------------------> 51 33 ba e4 32 6e 52 0d e5 94 b9 fb 79 fc 7c 1c
---------------------------------------------------------> c3 9c fc 03 8f 4c b0 1d c9 43 6a 6a 69 14 ce 76
---------------------------------------------------------> b0 69 ee 18 ce 4a bb 20 52 99 77 b2 df 3c 0c a9
---------------------------------------------------------> 36 39 84 da 77 f4 d0 f6 78 c3 a3 2b b1 cb 67 6c
---------------------------------------------------------> 0e 01 cb 27 3a 4e 3e 21 70 66 62 87 34 8d 01 e3
---------------------------------------------------------> ab 3a 34 d1 a2 24 93 67 76 7b 1e 0c f3 75 65 b7
---------------------------------------------------------> 24 9a 07 b9 90 dc 6b db 43 08 ea 0a 82 5c ac cf
Block2 encrypted 0x06 bytes------------------------------> 98 30 3d dd a0 5f
Block3 encrypted 0x08 bytes------------------------------> 6b 64 5b 4f 9d ea 72 f1
Padding -------------------------------------------------> cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc
Part1--> Decrypt Block1 0x70 bytes using RSA Mod1 with exp: 01 00 01
Block1 =
5133BAE4326E520DE594B9FB79FC7C1CC39CFC038F4CB01DC9 436A6A6914CE76B069EE18CE4ABB20529977B2DF3C0CA93639 84DA77F4D0F678C3A32BB1CB676C0E01CB273A4E3E21706662 87348D01E3AB3A34D1A2249367767B1E0CF37565B7249A07B9 90DC6BDB4308EA0A825CACCF
Exp = 010001
HD+3411 RSAMOD1 =
9DF5D60B66A6F839CDA448C9AC59E5AFE9FFA6BFB2AB141003 FADD94D47F2EB047764FCE1A62F32B51F1E892171894558B63 F55C0096FA36D4210B634358A3C11323A322DC3BC6040E09E5 79466CF384598C357945FE32C7711D1F59EBA9C44194EC02DF 561C1782B14A6F043BA81E63
Decrypted Result =
1247556FE71929C9761F128F7A604C000000AF626E45A45F8A E484DCDB3FF0FBC51B43976F4BFF93E741406CA34622955BE9 9F6C9C72A32D169423E3EB59D08AF31C2DC06FB16B5DC6BAF2 3AD4901EBEE6FE9FD145BC706CF43A9556C2B32F1BC5BDA349 9B3132A386E14E91B391264B
Decrypted Result Parse =
IDEA Key1-------------------------------------------------> 12 47 55 6F E7 19 29 C9 76 1F 12 8F 7A 60 4C 00 (Key will be used for encryption idea and later for MDC2 check)
header----------------------------------------------------> 00 00
Block decrypted 0x5C -------------------------------------> AF626E45A45F8AE484DCDB3FF0FBC51B
----------------------------------------------------------> 43976F4BFF93E741406CA34622955BE9
----------------------------------------------------------> 9F6C9C72A32D169423E3EB59D08AF31C
----------------------------------------------------------> 2DC06FB16B5DC6BAF23AD4901EBEE6FE
----------------------------------------------------------> 9FD145BC706CF43A9556C2B32F1BC5BD
----------------------------------------------------------> A3499B3132A386E14E91B391264B
Now we use IDEA KEY1 to encrypt Block3 "6b 64 5b 4f 9d ea 72 f1" = Result encrypted ==> "2F 43 1D 55 CB D7 22 35"
Now we build our first RSAkey to stored called RSA_N$6C
RSAKEY N6C result from DT05_00:
Block1 0x5C ----------------------------------------------> AF626E45A45F8AE484DCDB3FF0FBC51B
----------------------------------------------------------> 43976F4BFF93E741406CA34622955BE9
----------------------------------------------------------> 9F6C9C72A32D169423E3EB59D08AF31C
----------------------------------------------------------> 2DC06FB16B5DC6BAF23AD4901EBEE6FE
----------------------------------------------------------> 9FD145BC706CF43A9556C2B32F1BC5BD
----------------------------------------------------------> A3499B3132A386E14E91B391264B
Block2 0x06 ----------------------------------------------> 98303DDDA05F
New Block3 Idea encrypted 0x08 ---------------------------> 2F431D55CBD72235
RSA_N $6C =
AF626E45A45F8AE484DCDB3FF0FBC51B43976F4BFF93E74140 6CA34622955BE99F6C9C72A32D169423E3EB59D08AF31C2DC0 6FB16B5DC6BAF23AD4901EBEE6FE9FD145BC706CF43A9556C2 B32F1BC5BDA3499B3132A386E14E91B391264B98303DDDA05F 2F431D55CBD72235
Apply MDC2 checksum to verify key
so we add another 0x12 bytes header to the full key so it will have a full 0x7E lenght size, then we apply MDC2 check
MDC2 HASH=
000000000000000000000000000000000000AF626E45A45F8A E484DCDB3FF0FBC51B43976F4BFF93E741406CA34622955BE9 9F6C9C72A32D169423E3EB59D08AF31C2DC06FB16B5DC6BAF2 3AD4901EBEE6FE9FD145BC706CF43A9556C2B32F1BC5BDA349 9B3132A386E14E91B391264B98303DDDA05F2F431D55CBD722 35
MDC2 Result=
D2 47 55 6F E7 19 29 C9 76 1F 12 8F 7A 60 4C A6
IDEAKEY1 result =
12 47 55 6F E7 19 29 C9 76 1F 12 8F 7A 60 4C 00
It shows 0E BYTES are ok store RSAN_$6C for later use.
Store RSA N6C it will be used later in CMD$03 Step
===========> Example DT$05_10 Pairing Step2 <======================
############################################ HD+ 3411 DT05_10 Full Description Parse ################################################## ##############
CAM ===> CARD:
210016 80CA000010 1E3D4DB847F124F2B957D3AF51C24818 A0 2A
CAM CMD Parse:
NAD/PCB/LEN ---------------------------------------------> 21 00 16
CLA -----------------------------------------------------> 80 CA 00 00
CMD LEN -------------------------------------------------> 10
Encrypted AES CMD Data ----------------------------------> 1E 3D 4D B8 47 F1 24 F2 B9 57 D3 AF 51 C2 48 18
Decrypted AES CMD DATA ----------------------------------> 21 46 E8 D2 00 00 07 04 04 00 00 53 05 CC CC CC
Decrypted AES CMD DATA PARSE ----------------------------> 21 46 E8 D2
CMD SEQ -------------------------------------------------> 00 00 07
TYPE ----------------------------------------------------> 04
LEN -----------------------------------------------------> 04
CARD INS Cycle Counter ----------------------------------> 00 00 53
DT05 ----------------------------------------------------> 05
PADDING -------------------------------------------------> CC CC CC
Expected Card Reply data size 0xA0 bytes hex-------------> A0
LRC Checksum --------------------------------------------> 2A
CARD ===> CAM:
1200A2 E58107BA86B10BFC2523971122CE80C100D5546E533A0EFF6C C5AA2FB61787E3C37CE465A4D1147B800ED187E6B07AD8C9EC 56A015272BB791F3A9BC78325A5AC1097E2BDEF0EACE6AAFB2 0681358041B66FB5BF480CD3510BC0929F96B038C5E57C0A9F 080E8732703D14A2AF3AFBA25DA5544B60F2CE5567E2A9DA0A 0A8B29A50AEF15F4FAD307096254AF8CE9F3202FA79F12E8C6 15E9E886CF7ADEA93645 [9000] CA
CARD PARSE:
NAD/PCB/LEN ---------------------------------------------> 12 00 A2
ENCRYPTED AES CMD DATA ----------------------------------> E5 81 07 BA 86 B1 0B FC 25 23 97 11 22 CE 80 C1
---------------------------------------------------------> 00 D5 54 6E 53 3A 0E FF 6C C5 AA 2F B6 17 87 E3
---------------------------------------------------------> C3 7C E4 65 A4 D1 14 7B 80 0E D1 87 E6 B0 7A D8
---------------------------------------------------------> C9 EC 56 A0 15 27 2B B7 91 F3 A9 BC 78 32 5A 5A
---------------------------------------------------------> C1 09 7E 2B DE F0 EA CE 6A AF B2 06 81 35 80 41
---------------------------------------------------------> B6 6F B5 BF 48 0C D3 51 0B C0 92 9F 96 B0 38 C5
---------------------------------------------------------> E5 7C 0A 9F 08 0E 87 32 70 3D 14 A2 AF 3A FB A2
---------------------------------------------------------> 5D A5 54 4B 60 F2 CE 55 67 E2 A9 DA 0A 0A 8B 29
---------------------------------------------------------> A5 0A EF 15 F4 FA D3 07 09 62 54 AF 8C E9 F3 20
---------------------------------------------------------> 2F A7 9F 12 E8 C6 15 E9 E8 86 CF 7A DE A9 36 45
---------------------------------------------------------> 90 00
Checksum ------------------------------------------------> CA
Decrypted AES CMD DATA ----------------------------------> 04 68 0E B9 00 00 07 84 89 00 00 53 05 80 E0 00
---------------------------------------------------------> 00 00 34 11 10 7C 00 00 34 11 97 62 A9 CC D7 03
---------------------------------------------------------> 09 15 D5 5F 35 C8 74 8C 33 E7 58 37 26 DA 8E A1
---------------------------------------------------------> 4B 0E 75 52 FB 19 5E AF 76 B8 8F F6 73 61 DF 1F
---------------------------------------------------------> B5 1A 1C 3B BB D8 58 D8 56 99 C0 6A 9F 87 EA 22
---------------------------------------------------------> E2 3C EA 8D 8E D8 D2 CD 15 B6 69 B2 31 2F FF 31
---------------------------------------------------------> 68 AA 67 55 56 DB AE DC C9 D0 3C B1 69 FD 77 12
---------------------------------------------------------> 99 BF 11 21 74 A3 12 56 D7 08 C9 C0 AA 49 63 D8
---------------------------------------------------------> 59 2A 3D C8 1C 7A D7 0A 96 0E D6 C7 75 E8 D7 B2
---------------------------------------------------------> 69 07 CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
Decrypted AES CMD DATA PARSE ---------------------------->
CRC32 ---------------------------------------------------> 04 68 0E B9
CMD SEQ -------------------------------------------------> 00 00 07
CMD TYPE ------------------------------------------------> 84
CMD LEN -------------------------------------------------> 89
CARD INS PROCESSED COUNTER ------------------------------> 00 00 53
DT05 ----------------------------------------------------> 05
DT05_LEN ------------------------------------------------> 80
RESET ---------------------------------------------------> E0 00
Provider SyS ID -----------------------------------------> 00 00 34 11
DT05_TYPE -----------------------------------------------> 10
LEN -----------------------------------------------------> 7C
Provider SYS ID -----------------------------------------> 00 00 34 11
Block1 Chipered 0x70 hex bytes --------------------------> 97 62 A9 CC D7 03 09 15 D5 5F 35 C8 74 8C 33 E7
58 37 26 DA 8E A1 4B 0E 75 52 FB 19 5E AF 76 B8
8F F6 73 61 DF 1F B5 1A 1C 3B BB D8 58 D8 56 99
C0 6A 9F 87 EA 22 E2 3C EA 8D 8E D8 D2 CD 15 B6
69 B2 31 2F FF 31 68 AA 67 55 56 DB AE DC C9 D0
3C B1 69 FD 77 12 99 BF 11 21 74 A3 12 56 D7 08
C9 C0 AA 49 63 D8 59 2A 3D C8 1C 7A D7 0A 96 0E
Block2 --------------------------------------------------> D6 C7 75 E8 D7 B2 69 07
CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CC
STEP1 = Decrypt using RSAMOD1 the Block1 encrypted 0x70.
Block1 =
9762A9CCD7030915D55F35C8748C33E7583726DA8EA14B0E75 52FB195EAF76B88FF67361DF1FB51A1C3BBBD858D85699C06A 9F87EA22E23CEA8D8ED8D2CD15B669B2312FFF3168AA675556 DBAEDCC9D03CB169FD771299BF112174A31256D708C9C0AA49 63D8592A3DC81C7AD70A960E
Exp= 010001
RSAMOD1 =
9DF5D60B66A6F839CDA448C9AC59E5AFE9FFA6BFB2AB141003 FADD94D47F2EB047764FCE1A62F32B51F1E892171894558B63 F55C0096FA36D4210B634358A3C11323A322DC3BC6040E09E5 79466CF384598C357945FE32C7711D1F59EBA9C44194EC02DF 561C1782B14A6F043BA81E63
RSA_DEC_RESULT =>
11437ADA2AA85DCED7D4F9F588A43600843FC59F45C8BE8ADD 32EBBE22B95CA9321B900C23B52C9270DB86F09E92139509D2 DF487D79417652B9764D026DCECB0FE3210BA034A4192E2523 9CD701D55C8C82BA633686AD8F29612A3BF24240F15A82EB3C 9C5DADB3277C61E273496863
RSA Decrypted Block1 =
11437ADA2AA85DCED7D4F9F588A43600 -----------------------> IDEA KEY_1
843FC59F45C8BE8ADD32EBBE22B95CA9
321B900C23B52C9270DB86F09E921395
09D2DF487D79417652B9764D026DCECB
0FE3210BA034A4192E25239CD701D55C
8C82BA633686AD8F29612A3BF24240F1
5A82EB3C9C5DADB3277C61E273496863
2A4EE87DA0D0B36D ----------------------------------------> Block2 IDEA_ENCRYPTED
Final Result RSAN_$68
843FC59F45C8BE8ADD32EBBE22B95CA9321B900C23B52C9270 DB86F09E92139509D2DF487D79417652B9764D026DCECB0FE3 210BA034A4192E25239CD701D55C8C82BA633686AD8F29612A 3BF24240F15A82EB3C9C5DADB3277C61E2734968632A4EE87D A0D0B36D
===========> Example CMD$02 Generic Pairing Step3 <======================
This cmd Consists on sending the IRD generic FF FF FF FF + last 0x70 hex bytes of RSA_MODULUS88 + Diffie hellman increment byte
The first 0x18 bytes of the 0x88 RSAmodulus keys will also be expanded IDEA (first 0x10 ideakey , last 0x08 offset)
CRC32 ---------------------------------------------------> 3F 34 74 6B
CMD SEQ -------------------------------------------------> 00 00 09
CMD TYPE ------------------------------------------------> 0E
CMD LEN -------------------------------------------------> 7B
0F 5D 42 36 ---------------------------------------------> DATA1 (This will be copied and used on CMD$03 build sequence)
00
FF FF FF FF ---------------------------------------------> STB IRD Number generic the same for all
34 11 ---------------------------------------------------> Provide SYS ID
85 5F A5 6A C7 96 BE D5 99 87 B0 40 D4 D0 C0 1F ---------> Last 0x70 Bytes of Unique RSA Modulus key 35(88) paired to STB
84 4C 52 6C 88 4E 80 3A 1F 40 EA EF A8 8F 24 95
AA 79 C7 3C FE 79 06 44 28 8E CE 3E 23 86 81 30
78 A3 82 B0 DC 6E B5 4F 81 83 D2 A6 8C 49 3C 8A
7C 5C D5 52 BE 08 0D 81 6B 9B 16 0D 86 BE BA 21
1C E2 4C 4B 8F 96 37 F9 55 1F 03 86 28 DB 82 D4
8D 51 49 59 36 A7 A2 DA E1 9F 11 76 E8 50 40 6B
CCCCCCCC
CARD REPLY
EB50B77C -------------------------------------------------> CRC32
000009 ---------------------------------------------------> CMD SEQUENCE
8E -------------------------------------------------------> CMD TYPE
10 -------------------------------------------------------> CMD LEN
00 00 01 46 ----------------------------------------------> Increment Counter Reply
00 -------------------------------------------------------> Status Flag00 "Smartcard Generic pairing mode only"
49 15 C8 54 ----------------------------------------------> Smartcard Serial number
5A 4D 32 5B ----------------------------------------------> DATA2 (This will be copied and used on CMD$03 build sequence)
00 8C A0
CCCCCCCCCCCCCC
===========> Example unique pairing mode CMD$0E step3 <================
CMD$0E sends extra data "CHIPSET NUID" SO THE CARD can calculate the 3DES Keys on init based on the CHIPSET NUID.
It also sends the unique 016c PK RSA_modulus 0x88 key stored in offset 35(88) but only the last 0x70 bytes of the unique key
CRC32 ---------------------------------------------------> 3F 34 74 6B
CMD SEQ -------------------------------------------------> 00 00 09
CMD TYPE ------------------------------------------------> 0E
CMD LEN -------------------------------------------------> 83
0F 5D 42 36 ---------------------------------------------> DATA1 (This will be copied and used on CMD$03 build sequence) The last byte gets increment+1 on each smartcard init
00
6B 4C A7 9B ---------------------------------------------> STB IRD Number
34 11 ---------------------------------------------------> Provide SYS ID
85 5F A5 6A C7 96 BE D5 99 87 B0 40 D4 D0 C0 1F ---------> Last 0x70 Bytes of Unique RSA Modulus key 35(88) paired to STB
84 4C 52 6C 88 4E 80 3A 1F 40 EA EF A8 8F 24 95
AA 79 C7 3C FE 79 06 44 28 8E CE 3E 23 86 81 30
78 A3 82 B0 DC 6E B5 4F 81 83 D2 A6 8C 49 3C 8A
7C 5C D5 52 BE 08 0D 81 6B 9B 16 0D 86 BE BA 21
1C E2 4C 4B 8F 96 37 F9 55 1F 03 86 28 DB 82 D4
8D 51 49 59 36 A7 A2 DA E1 9F 11 76 E8 50 40 6B
A5 EA 1D EB ---------------------------------------------> CHIPSET PAIRED NUID OF STB
00 08 ---------------------------------------------------> OTP CSC "Chipset secure Core" No. of keys 8
00 00 ---------------------------------------------------> OTA CSC "Chipset secure Core" No. of keys 0
CCCCCCCC
The first 0x18 bytes of the RSA_88 key will be IDEA Expanded to obtain P & Q 0x34 keys which will generate RSA the 0x68 RSA data used on CMD$03
And the card replies back
EB50B77C -------------------------------------------------> CRC32
000009 ---------------------------------------------------> CMD SEQUENCE
8E -------------------------------------------------------> CMD TYPE
10 -------------------------------------------------------> CMD LEN
00 00 01 46 ----------------------------------------------> Increment Counter Reply
40 -------------------------------------------------------> Status Flag40 "Smartcard Unique pairing mode only"
49 15 C8 54 ----------------------------------------------> Smartcard Serial number
5A 4D 32 5B ----------------------------------------------> DATA2 (This will be copied and used on CMD$03 build sequence) The last byte gets increment+1 on each smartcard init
00 8C A0
CCCCCCCCCCCCCC
===========> Example CMD$03 Pairing Step 4 <====================
This is the main pairing CMD, if all the steps from previous cmds have been done properly then you should have a set of 3 Keys
RSA_N 6C 0x6C Size rsa (this is result decrypted data from DT05_00)
RSA_N 68 0x68 size rsa (This is the result decrypted data from DT05_10 for generic pairing only) if using DT05_20 for unique pairing then will need to get 0x68 rsa from unique pairing expasion data
RSA_N 60 0x60 size rsa (This is the result of RSA_modulus88 0x18 first bytes key expansion)
After all this 3 Keys are ready we follow the next step.
CMD$03 ------------------------> STEP1 Build block 0x60 data with following data
000000FF+MOD50+IRD+DATA1+DATA2 = 0x60 bytes data
Generic pairing
000000FF + DB9E1F1BD23C6153444E444D8E6C471E162EC63C599D44F476 E0D40C3840E0FDB7B63D174DD73B575543983F2F2DFB94E364 4958AE642C91636A6BE55528478EB7A422479598C68E6F1FC9 D647BBC4D5 + FFFFFFFF + 0F5D4236 + 5A4D325B
Unique pairing 0x60 build up
000000FF + DB9E1F1BD23C6153444E444D8E6C471E162EC63C599D44F476 E0D40C3840E0FDB7B63D174DD73B575543983F2F2DFB94E364 4958AE642C91636A6BE55528478EB7A422479598C68E6F1FC9 D647BBC4D5 + 6B4CA79B + 0F5D4236 + 5A4D325B
Then encrypt this block using our previous calculated key RSA_N $60 using EXP: 010001 = Store final block RSA encrypted value xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
CMD$03 -------------------------> STEP2 Build Block 0x68 data with previous FINAL BLOCK RSA ENCRYPTED 0x60 value from step1 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
000000FF + CARD SERIAL NO. + FINAL BLOCK RSA ENCRYPTED 0x60 Value from step1
Then encrypt the new 0x68 block using the previous RSA_N $68 key calculated from DT05_20 steps or DT05_10 steps.... = Store Final block 0x68 RSA encrypted Value YYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY
CMD$03 -------------------------> STEP3 Build last block 0x6C data using previous FINAL BLOCK RSA ENCRYPTED 0x68 value
000000FF + FINAL BLOCK RSA ENCRYPTED 0x68 Value
Then encrypt the new 0x6C block created using the RSA_N $6C key previously calculated from DTO05_00 First Step... = Store Final Block 0x6C RSA encrypted Value ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
Value zzzzzzzzzz is the example value below 63EB8E65zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzCD A2
This will need to be setup correclty and encrypted using CRC32 to build a good cmd to send to the smartcard.
STB SEND TO CARD:
00000A -------------------------------------> CMD SEQUENCE
03 -----------------------------------------> CMD TYPE CMD$03
6C -----------------------------------------> CMD LEN
63EB8E655372B5B97B312B11BDE3CED7 -----------> FINAL BLOCK 0x6C RSA encrypted value sent for smartcard to check pairing (but this time the card will reply back with AES generated SessionKEY instead of IDEA on previous generation cards)
F42079AD421A5E35B22D502CA9F29ACF
07F26FF05F93A205ED6FB3FB17BF83D9
9322B895FF0C7E07C25DAA121FECE6A3
B5423F627A9D7BA40A793EE257994D3F
D89240EDCE0EEA2969781334B7397AE0
10E441D9E3816C62E99FCDA2
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
CARD REPLY
723057A2 -----------------------------------> CRC 32
00000A -------------------------------------> CMD SEQUENCE
83 -----------------------------------------> CMD TYPE
69 -----------------------------------------> CMD LEN
00 -----------------------------------------> PADDING
--------------------------------------------> IN SOME UNIQUE PAIRING TYPES THE SMARTCARD REPLIES THE FIRST 8 BYTES UNENCRYPTED = 4 BYTES + IRD Leaving the other 60 bytes encrypted
(need to decrypt with 016C PK RSAkey 34(60) )
--------------------------------------------> In this case the 0x68 bytes are encrypted we decrypt the full block with RSA_N $68 From previous DT05xx
6883C826BBD839A3DE20ED09C6295CE1
86B356686F6C3CAC928496FB6FACF01E
4CB4DED9F2A58D951D8A716EE6F7B257
40D52D6DE6BC5BC14B638ACA1E6D7F42
704509E1B6ADF06DD6185D7270B3775E
79FC10367D9F28C5E459D60CB67562C9
9CF192BACFF2BF466EF67998857DE477
4DA89302C32488EC
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
we have 0x68 bytes still encrypted (after decrypt it will contain first 0x50bytes still encrypted + Smartcard serial number + data1 + data2 )
The first 0x50 bytes encrypted need to be decrypted with DATA50 + EXP: 00112233445566770011223344556677 key = Store decrypted result 0x50bytes
result 0x50bytes need to be hashed with MDC2 using padding 0000 = Final result 0x10 "AKA" 16 byte new session key generated which will be used in AES_ECB mode.
Once the new Session key is decrypted and stored, we init DT$04 DT$02 DT$03 DT$07 and DT$0C CMDS to read card entitlements data and new Class EMM-group filters for EMM-G/S/U
This cmds will output all Provider ids available to the card and EMM groups ProvID 3411, 3511
F4DA66FF 00000E 04 04 000000 02 CCCCCC
4F4F3A86 00000E 84 07 00004E 02 0F FE00
744AC698 00000F 04 04 000000 02 CCCCCC
71957682 00000F 84 18 00004E 02 0F FE00 00 00003411 0515F0006006000000000001 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
7EB93014 000010 04 04 00004F 02 CCCCCC
567FE8C1 000010 84 07 FFFFFF0000FFFF
8206DBE3 000011 04 04 000000 04 CCCCCC
077626FD 000012 04 04 000000 04 CCCCCC
206BB272 000012 84 5F 000050 04 56 E000 00 00003411 520B600134110884003BFFFFFF07600134110882FF11600134 110883C815490010FFFFFFFF00FF11600134110883C8154954 00FFFFFFFFFFFF11600134110887C815490000FFFFFFFF00FF 07600234110380FE CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
4BF3EC45 000013 04 04 000051 04 CCCCCC
5484BD29 000013 84 07 000051 04 32 E000
C543ABA9 000014 04 04 000051 04 CCCCCC
42EF1B15 000014 84 3B 000051 04 32 E000 00 008034112E0B600134110884003BFFFFFF07600134110882FF 11600134110883C815495400FFFFFFFFFFFF07600234110380 FECCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
9EC4A359 000015 04 04 000052 04 CCCCCC
C30B9182 000015 84 07 00005B 04 56 E000
1BB45E47 000016 04 04 000052 04 CCCCCC
62C1ED87 000016 84 5F 00005B 04 56 E000 0000003511520B600135110884003BFFFFFF07600135110882 FF11600135110883C815490010FFFFFFFF00FF116001351108 83C815495400FFFFFFFFFFFF116001351108870000000000FF FFFFFF00FF07600235110380FE CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
6823B5BF 000017 04 04 00005C 04 CCCCCC
AF1228F5 000017 84 07 00005E 04 56 E000
F11287B7 000018 04 04 00005C 04 CCCCCC
D98415F3 000018 84 5F 00005E 04 56 E000 00 00003512520B600135120884003BFFFFFF07600135120882FF 11600135120883C815490010FFFFFFFF00FF11600135120883 C815495400FFFFFFFFFFFF116001351208870000000000FFFF FFFF00FF07600235120380FECCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
AA958F47 000019 04 04 00005F 04 CCCCCC
C503FEA6 000019 84 07 000060 04 56 E000
2FE57259 00001A 04 04 00005F 04 CCCCCC
C396933E 00001A 84 5F 000060 04 56 E000 00 00003513520B600135130884003BFFFFFF07600135130882FF 11600135130883C815490010FFFFFFFF00FF11600135130883 C815495400FFFFFFFFFFFF116001351308870000000000FFFF FFFF00FF07600235130380FECCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
DCC59602 00001B 04 04 000061 04 CCCCCC
52F96CC5 00001B 84 07 000062 04 56 E000
5275D1EE 00001C 04 04 000061 04 CCCCCC
8E48AEDB 00001C 84 5F 000062 04 56 E000 00 00003504520B600135040884003BFFFFFF07600135040882FF 11600135040883C815490010FFFFFFFF00FF11600135040883 C815495400FFFFFFFFFFFF116001350408870000000000FFFF FFFF00FF07600235040380FECCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
40FFBE93 00001D 04 04 000063 04 CCCCCC
EE37C7D7 00001D 84 07 000064 04 56 E000
C58F438D 00001E 04 04 000063 04 CCCCCC
AB54BA48 00001E 84 5F 000064 04 56 E000 00 00003505520B600135050884003BFFFFFF07600135050882FF 11600135050883C815490010FFFFFFFF00FF11600135050883 C815495400FFFFFFFFFFFF116001350508870000000000FFFF FFFF00FF07600235050380FECCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
F7F1AF73 00001F 04 04 000065 04 CCCCCC
79CD55B4 00001F 84 07 000066 04 56 E000
1FC7A123 000020 04 04 000065 04 CCCCCC
DB155A51 000020 84 5F 000066 04 56 E000 00 00008011520B600180110884003BFFFFFF07600180110882FF 11600180110883C815490010FFFFFFFF00FF11600180110883 C815495400FFFFFFFFFFFF116001801108870000000000FFFF FFFF00FF07600280110380FECCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0D4DCE5E 000021 04 04 000067 04 CCCCCC
A7E874FE 000021 84 07 FFFFFF0000FFFF
6AF3E4CE 000022 04 04 000000 03 CCCCCC
4D0339FB 000022 84 07 00004F 03 4DFC00
EA6344A9 000023 04 04 000000 03 CCCCCC
668979AD 000023 84 56 00004F 03 4DFC0000000034119C5AD7DB89400000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000103E1003BCC
E1CB0E17 000024 04 04 000050 03 CCCCCC
86AA3BBB 000024 84 07 00005A 03 0CF500
615BAE70 000025 04 04 000050 03 CCCCCC
1A339EC2 000025 84 15 00005A 03 0CF500000000351101FFFFFFFF02F00100CCCC
7ED5FCFF 000026 04 04 00005B 03 CCCCCC
3B3772E4 000026 84 07 00005D 03 09F100
FE455C98 000027 04 04 00005B 03 CCCCCC
6621790D 000027 84 12 00005D 03 09F100000000351201FFFFFFFF00 CCCCCCCCCC
0E8D8A9E 000028 04 04 00005E 03 CCCCCC
B08C2F91 000028 84 07 00005F 03 09F100
8E1D2AF9 000029 04 04 00005E 03 CCCCCC
B954A7A3 000029 84 12 00005F 03 09F100000000351301FFFFFFFF00 CCCCCCCCCC
78DD93DB 00002A 04 04 000060 03 CCCCCC
C6DC36D4 00002A 84 07 000061 03 09F100
F84D33BC 00002B 04 04 000060 03 CCCCCC
05F2060A 00002B 84 12 000061 03 09F100000000350401FFFFFFFF00 CCCCCCCCCC
E4E7BB4A 00002C 04 04 000062 03 CCCCCC
5AE61E45 00002C 84 07 000063 03 09F100
64771B2D 00002D 04 04 000062 03 CCCCCC
C45D92F1 00002D 84 12 000063 03 09F100000000350501FFFFFFFF00 CCCCCCCCCC
53E9AAAA 00002E 04 04 000064 03 CCCCCC
EDE80FA5 00002E 84 07 000065 03 09F100
D3790ACD 00002F 04 04 000064 03 CCCCCC
CD68FD46 00002F 84 12 000065 03 09F100000000801101FFFFFFFF00 CCCCCCCCCC
F7501C17 000030 04 04 000066 03 CCCCCC
087A3F51 000030 84 07 FFFFFF0000FFFF
591CD87C 000031 04 04 000000 08 CCCCCC
33CF8400 000031 84 07 00005C 08 16 FF00
DC6C2562 000032 04 04 000000 08 CCCCCC
363495C5 000032 84 1F 00005C 08 16 FF00 00000035110000000100000001B40000000001040000FFFFCC CCCCCCCCCCCCCC
F1F46B5F 000033 04 04 00005D 08 CCCCCC
8D0AC24F 000033 84 07 FFFFFF0000FFFF
3724A488 000034 04 04 000000 07 CCCCCC
BE7AFF23 000034 84 07 000054 07 05F000
B7B404EF 000035 04 04 000000 07 CCCCCC
2E01785E 000035 84 0E 000054 07 05F000000080341100F0CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
DE2510AD 000036 04 04 000055 07 CCCCCC
F297C5D7 000036 84 07 000055 07 05F000
5EB5B0CA 000037 04 04 000055 07 CCCCCC
D6F269DF 000037 84 0E 000055 07 05F000000080341101F0CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
1C932A55 000038 04 04 000056 07 CCCCCC
3021FF2F 000038 84 07 000056 07 05F000
9C038A32 000039 04 04 000056 07 CCCCCC
AB7BFC07 000039 84 0E 000056 07 05F000000000341102F0CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
507E10A1 00003A 04 04 000057 07 CCCCCC
7CCCC5DB 00003A 84 07 000057 07 05F000
D0EEB0C6 00003B 04 04 000057 07 CCCCCC
3D0F1D3F 00003B 84 0E 000057 07 05F000000080341103F0CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
E454DB38 00003C 04 04 000058 07 CCCCCC
C8E60E42 00003C 84 07 000058 07 05F000
64C47B5F 00003D 04 04 000058 07 CCCCCC
F7C63F51 00003D 84 0E 000058 07 05F000000080341104F0 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
A8B9E1CC 00003E 04 04 000059 07 CCCCCC
11DBAD3E 00003E 84 07 FFFFFF0000FFFF
3C480616 00003F 04 04 000000 0C CCCCCC
25E7EBED 00003F 84 07 000068 0C 20F878
6875A766 000040 04 04 000000 0C CCCCCC
16FE7ADA 000040 84 29 000068 0C 20F87800001080115D0000680000405B53C901094F59000DAC 59000F9F5790B941FFFFFFFF CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
E5AE657B 000041 04 04 000069 0C CCCCCC
B8478D77 000041 84 07 000069 0C 20F878
60DE9865 000042 04 04 000069 0C CCCCCC
A207B4BE 000042 84 29 000069 0C 20F87800000080115D00006900002047B4D601094F59000FA0 5900119347AF9001FFFFFFFF CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
3B599095 000043 04 04 00006A 0C CCCCCC
After full card init, Card Processes ECM new CMD$05 Filters the PRE-CAM mode from Stream and modifies header of ECM before sending it to the smartcard card, if not sent correctly the
smartcard will crash.
The new Header must have correct size len + new ECM header.
There is also a new status flag that the card replies with together with the CW telling the card when to reinit and re-issue a new SessionKey.
The new CW reply needs to be decrypted in AES_ECB mode with the SK, after that if using 3DES hw key enabled on ECM it needs to be decrypted with the 3DES HW key.
